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The Manager 
Schenectady Naval Reactors Office 
United States Department of Energy 
Schenectady, New York 
Subject: Request for Naval Reactors Comment on Proposed PROMETHEUS Space 
Flight Nuclear Reactor High Tier Reactor Safety Requirements and for Naval 
Reactors Approval to Transmit These Requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
References: 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group Recommendations on Nuclear 
Propulsion Safety for the Space Exploration Initiative, September 27, 1991. 
DOE OSNP-I, Nuclear Safety Criteria and Specifications for Space Nuclear 
Reactors, August 1982. 
Applied Physics Laboratory, Nuclear Space Power Safety and Facility 
Guidelines Study, September 1995. 
Lockheed Martin GPHS-RTGs in support of the Cassini Mission, Final 
Safety Report (FSAR), May 30, ,1997. 
DOE/SF/12209-T1 TI86 026240, SP-100 Surety Evaluation Interim Report, 
June 1985. 
DOE-STD-3009-94, "Preparation Guide for U.S Department of Energy 
Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses", July 1994. 
Dear Sir: 
The purpose of this letter is to request Naval Reactors comments on the nuclear reactor high 
tier requirements for the PROMETHEUS space flight reactor design, pre-launch operations, 
launch, ascent, operation, and disposal, and to request Naval Reactors approval to transmit 
these requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory to ensure consistency between the reactor 
safety requirements and the spacecraft safety requirements. 
The proposed PROMETHEUS nuclear reactor high tier safety requirements are consistent with 
the long standing safety culture of the Naval Reactors Program and its commitment to 
protecting the health and safety of the public and the environment. In addition, the philosophy 
on which these requirements are based is consistent with the Nuclear Safety Policy Working 
Group recommendations on space nuclear propulsion safety (Reference I), DOE Nuclear 
Safety Criteria and Specifications for Space Nuclear Reactors (Reference 2), the Nuclear Space 
Power Safety and Facility Guidelines Study of the Applied Physics Laboratory 
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 
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(Reference 3), and the safety approach of previous space exploration missions and projects, 
such as Cassini (Reference 4) and SP-100 (Reference 5). 
1. DISCUSSION 
A. Space Reactor Safety Requirements 
Consistent with Naval Reactors program philosophy, the cornerstone of the 
PROMETHEUS nuclear reactor safety approach is that no undue risk to the health and 
safety of workers, the public, or adverse effects to the environment should result from 
activities associated with the nuclear reactor of the PROMETHEUS project. 
A three-tier approach has been used in the development of the PROMETHEUS space reactor 
safety requirements. The first tier requirements are of general nature, and are consistent with 
the reactor safety philosophy for the PROMETHEUS project. They apply to all PROMETHEUS 
reactors, including land-based test 1 prototype reactors, space-based test I prototype reactors, 
and flight reactors that will power specific space exploration missions (e.g., the. Jupiter Icy 
Moons Orbiter (JIMO)) throughout their life-cycle from fabrication through disposal. 
The Tier 2 requirements discussed below are qualitative in nature. They are applicable 
specifically to flight reactors from receipt at the launch site through launch and subsequent 
operations. They address reactor safety considerations associated with pre-launch operations, 
launch, ascent, operation, and disposal of the PROMETHEUS flight reactors. 
This letter contains Tier-1 requirements for all PROMETHEUS reactors and Tier-2 requirements 
for the PROMETHEUS iiignt reactors. Tne aeiaiiea, quaniiiaiive, rnissiuil-spetiik je.g., 
PROMETHEUS-I) Tier-3 reactor safety requirements will be submitted for NR approval under a 
separate cover. Tier-2 and Tier-3 safety requirements for operations at core vendor facilities, 
ground based nuclear test facilities, and disposal facilities are anticipated to be generally similar 
to those invoked for other Naval Reactors program reactors and any required changes to those 
requirements or differences in implementation will also be addressed separately. 
A.l PROMETHEUS Project Tier 1 Reactor Safety Requirements 
In order to achieve the safety philosophy above, the health and safety of the public and the 
environment must be protected from the hazards due to all activities related to the 
PROMETHEUS project. However, it is recognized that some increase in risk is inevitable. It 
should be a high tier requirement that the increase in risk due to PROMETHEUS project 
activities be reduced to a level that is insignificant by comparison to the overall risk that is 
associated with other human activities and is normally accepted (i.e., driving a car, flying on an 
airplane, etc.) 
1. Construction, transportation and operation of a flight reactor, flight prototypes and 
ground based prototype reactors will not result in a significant increase in risk to the 
health and safety of the public and to the environment relative to the risk associated 
with normal human activity. 
The term "significant increase in risk" will be defined as part of the Tier 3 requirements. 
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6 A.2 PROMETHEUS Flight Reactors Tier 2 Reactor Safety Requirements 
As shown on Table 1, the typical space reactor flight unit safety issues naturally fall into three 
categories: 
1. Protection of the public and the environment from energy and radiation due to criticality of 
the reactor: The risk to the public either due to the energy released by criticality, due to 
exposure to direct radiation produced by fission or due to dispersion of fission products 
should be acceptably small. 
2. Protection of the public and the environment from accidental dispersion of hazardous 
materials: The risk to the health of the public due to dispersal of hazardous materials 
associated with the Prometheus reactor (e.g., uranium, beryllium) should be acceptably 
small. 
3. Ensuring control of the special nuclear material (e.g., highly enriched uranium) to minimize 
the potential that such material will come under the possession of persons or organizations 
that would be inclined to use it for illicit purposes such as terrorism or extortion: The risk 
associated with potential loss of control of special nuclear material (e.g., highly enriched 
uranium) should be acceptably small. 
As can be noticed from Table 1, each of these three issues could arise as a result of a number 
of initiating events during several phases of operations that start with delivery of the reactor to 
the launch site and include launch, ascent, operation, and disposal. The following section 
provides a safety approach to address the concerns listed in Table 1. The discussion is 
organized into sections along the three main categories of safety issues (radiological and 
criticality safety, special nuclear material safeguards, and protection from toxic material 
exposure), and further subdivided into operational phases, where applicable. 
1. Radioloaical and Criticalitv Safety 
Pre-Launch Phase 
The PROMETHEUS reactors should not contain any significant amount of fission products prior 
to planned startup following launch. Therefore, with the exception of testing for a short period of 
time in order to ensure that it is manufactured according to specifications and that it will perform 
as expected, startup and operation of the reactor, either intentional or accidental, should not be 
allowed and should be precluded. This requirement may be expressed as follows: 
1.1 The risk to the health and safety of the public due to operation or 
inadvertent startup of a PROMETHEUS reactor prior to launch (including 
assembly and preilaunch operations at the launch site) shall be reduced to 
an acceptable level by a combination of design features, detailed 
procedures, and rigorous training and oversight. 
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Launch and Ascent Phase 
The launch and ascent of the spacecraft to orbit is a crucial evolution. An accident during 
launch, such as a launch vehicle explosion, could subject the reactor to high stresses, shock, 
and potential impacts with components of the launch vehicle and with the ground. An accident 
during ascent could prevent the spacecraft from achieving earth orbit. The reactor would impact 
the earth at high velocity, suffer distortion, be surrounded with reflective materials such as sand, 
or be flooded and surrounded with water. These events have the potential of resulting in a 
critical configuration and the release of significant amounts of energy and radioactivity. It is 
imperative that the health and safety of the public be protected from the consequences of such 
an event. Therefore both aspects of risk, the probability and the potential consequences of 
criticality, under such conditions should be minimized. This leads to the following requirement: 
1.2 The PROMETHEUS flight reactor design shall include features to reduce to an 
acceptable level the risk to the public due to inadvertent criticality as a result of an 
accident during launch and ascent to earth orbit. 
Operation Phase 
For a time after departure from earth orbit, it is possible that an accident could damage the 
reactor, terminate or re-orient thrust, and place the spacecraft and its damaged reactor on a 
traiectorv from which it could re-enter Earth's atmosphere. Because the reactor would have 
been op&ating for a while, it would contain fission products, which could be dispersed in the 
atmosphere. Therefore, the ~otential of such an event should be minimized. This leads to the 
following requirement: 
1.3 Earth re-entry of a'reactor airer power operaiion shaii be preciuded ioi a;; 
normal conditions and credible accident conditions by a combination of 
planning, operational controls and design features. 
2. Environmental Protection 
Long before protection of the environment became a prevalent endeavor among the general 
public, it was a high priority in the Naval Reactors Program. The Program maintains the same 
rigorous attitude towards the control of radioactivity and protection of the environment as it does 
toward reactor design, testing, operation, and servicing. The same rigorous attitude towards 
protection of the environment shall be applied to all activities associated with the space reactor 
program. This ensures that the environmental record of nuclear powered spaceships will be 
equal to the well documented record which demonstrates the absence of environmental effect 
from the operation of U.S. nuclear powered ships. 
The environmental concern associated with the PROMETHEUS flight reactors is that, without 
proper design and operation, toxic andlor radioactive materials could be released in the 
atmosphere or in a region of space near earth. 
The nuclear reactor system could include toxic materials (e.g., beryllium). These materials 
could ablate during re-entry and be dispersed into the atmosphere. The amount of toxic 
material that could be dispersed under such conditions should be minimized so as not to 
present a risk to the health of the public. This may be expressed as 
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@ 2. I The PROMETHEUS flight nuclear systems shall be designed with positive 
measures or features to reduce to an acce~table level the amount of toxic 
and radioactive materials that could be diipersed during credible 
IauncMascent or reentry accidents. 
After the mission has been completed, the reactor must be disposed of in such a manner as to 
reduce the potential that it could contaminate a region of space or the surface of a planet or a 
moon with radioactive or otherwise hazardous materials and thus impact future missions. 
2.2 Mission planning for PROMETHEUS flight reactor systems shall include 
disposal in a manner that avoids unacceptable impact on extraterrestrial 
environments. 
3. S~ecial Nuclear Materials Securitv and Safeauards 
Safeguarding the special nuclear material of the reactor to preclude its use by persons, 
governments, or organizations with the intent to harm and terrorize the public and harm the 
interest of the United States is of paramount importance. The reactor system should be 
designed such that, in the event of an accident during launch and ascent to orbit that would 
result in the reactor and its special nuclear material crashing to Earth, the special nuclear 
material can be quickly recovered. This requirement may be expressed as follows: 
3.1 Positive features shall be provided to aid in the recovery of the special nuclear 
material in the event of an accident during launch, ascent to earth orbit, or 
accidental re-entry. 
The security and special material safeguards requirements during ground operations, 
(e.g., reactor core manufacturing, testing, assembly, transportation) will be developed 
and will be submitted to NR at a later time. 
Ill. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES CONSIDERED 
Several alternative space reactor safety approaches and corresponding reactor safety 
requirements to those described above were considered. They are presented here for 
completeness and Naval Reactors information, but are not recommended. These 
include the following: 
A. The overall PROMETHEUS project reactor safety philosophy (Tier 1) should be based on 
traditional Naval Reactors philosophy that emphasizes the safety culture of the Naval reactors 
program and the "defense-in-depthUand the "As Low As Reasonably Achievable (AURA)" 
principles. 
The corresponding Tier 1 reactor safety requirements proposed were: 
1. The primary emphasis of the design, construction, testing, operation, and 
disposal of space reactor plants (and land-based prototypes) shall be the highest 
level of reliabilitv and safetv. .
2. A defense-in-depth approach shall be used to develop and verify the nuclear 
technology that will be the power source for space reactor plants. 
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3. Personnel radiation exposure as a result of the operation of a space reactor plant 
(or land-based prototype) shall be reduced to the lowest level that is reasonably 
achievable. 
These requirements are not recommended as Tier 1 requirements because they either 
redundant with the recommended Tier 1 requirement, or they are "implementation 
strategies" to ensure that the public and the environment are protected. In addition, the 
AURA principle by itself is not a requirement; rather, it is a goal, or an objective to "do 
better" than the minimum required. 
6. The reactor safety requirements should focus on ensuring that the PROMETHEUS 
flight reactors will not result in undue risk to the heath and safety of the public and the 
environment. 
This approach was not recommended because of the difficulty in defining "undue risk" in 
the context of a discretionarv activitv. It de~ends. largely, on an individual's assessment 
. - .  
of the value of the activity.' 
C. The reactor safety approach for the PROMETHEUS flight reactors (Tier 2) should be 
consistent with the traditional, deterministic approach of the Naval Reactors program. 
This approach led to a proposed requirement that criticality be precluded for all 
accidents assuming a single failure of the protective system. 
The deterministic approach is not recommended for the PROMETHEUS flight reactors. 
The number of accident scenar~os that couia be postuiaiea is exiremeiy iarge. iviosi oi 
these scenarios would be extremely unlikely. With a strictly deterministic approach, all 
of these would have to be analyzed, and acceptable performance would have to be 
demonstrated regardless of the probability of occurrence. This is judged to be 
impractical (because of the large number of possible scenarios), undesirable (because 
analysis of low probability scenarios will divert resources from analyses of other, higher 
probability scenarios), and unnecessary (because an acceptable alternative - a 
probabilistic approach - is available. A probabilistic approach has been used in the 
safety analyses of past space exploration missions which used RTG power sources, 
e.g., the Cassini mission. The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel is more familiar 
with and likely to expect a probabilistic approach). 
D. The approach of the tier 2 requirements should focus on ensuring that events that 
could place the public and the environment at risk are "implausible". 
This approach resulted in the following Tier-2 requirements 
1.1 Plant design features and procedural controls shall be implemented such 
that an intentional or inadvertent startup of a PROMETHEUS flight reactor 
prior to launch (including assembly and pre-launch operations), other than 
for test purposes, is implausible. 
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1.2 The PROMETHEUS flight reactor design shall include features such that an 
inadvertent criticality as a result of an accident during launch and ascent to  earth 
orbit i s  implausible. 
1.3 The PROMETHEUS flight reactor design shall include features such that the 
dispersion of fission ~ roduc ts  or toxic material in the Earth atmos~here is 
1.4 The PROMETHEUS flight reactors shall be designed for all normal 
conditions and credible accident conditions such that the reentry of a 
damaged reactor and the dispersion of fission products and toxic materials 
in  the Earth atmosphere is  implausible. 
This approach is not recommended, because it focuses on probability, rather than risk 
(i.e., probability times consequences). Instead, the recommended Tier-2 requirements 
focus on minimization of risk. This allows for specific limits of probability and 
consequences to be defined as part of the Tier-3 requirements. In addition, a single, 
specific, universally accepted definition of "implausible" is not available. 
E. The reactor safety requirements should include acceptance criteria, which provide clearly 
defined risk-based absolute criteria, or criteria that represents goals. The establishment of 
safety requirements as currently recommended is a qualitative approach to ensure adequate 
safety. The objective is to assure that the risks to the public and the environment are 
acceptable. Without an acceptance criteria proposed with the safety requirements, no real 
method exists to ensure that the safety requirements are being met and ultimately the 
minimization of risk to the public is assured. 
Implementing quantitative acceptance criteria, based on estimates of measurable risk, would 
allow measurable and defendable risk metrics. For example, criterion 2.1 could be modified as 
follows, 
"The PROMETHEUS flight nuclear systems shall be designed with positive 
measures or features such that the amount of toxic material released and the 
subsequent environmental contamination will be below the maximum allowable 
concentrations established by the EPA or appropriate governing body." 
In an analogous manner, similar acceptance criteria could be incorporated into all of the other 
safety requirements. 
One advantage to this approach is that the design community has concrete agreed uDon rules 
that, if met, would ensure reactor safety and miiimization of iisk to the public.- A disadvantage 
to this approach is that the establishment of quantitative criterion at this early development 
stage may be premature, and some quantitative requirements may have to be revisdd in the 
future. 
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IV. SUMMARY 
The proposed high tier reactor safety requirements for the PROMETHEUS project and for the 
PROMETHEUS flight reactors are presented. The focus of the PROMETHEUS nuclear reactor 
safety philosophy and objectives is the protection of the heath and safety of the public and the 
environment from the hazards associated with the construction, trans~ortation and o~eration of a flight reactor, flight prototypes and ground based prototype reactors. These hazards include 
radioloaical hazards. ~otential loss and misuse of the s~ecial nuclear materials, and dis~ersion 
of toxicmaterials.  he reactor safety requirements for the PROMETHEUS flight reactors focus 
on the protection of the heath and safety of the public and the environment during launch 
preparations, launch and ascent to earth orbit, operation, and disposal. The proposed reactor 
safety high tier requirements for the PROMETHEUS project (tier 1 requirements) and for the 
flight reactor (tier 2 requirements) are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. 
V. NAVAL REACTORS ACTION REQUESTED 
NR comments are requested on the proposed tier-1 reactor safety requirements for the 
PROMETHEUS project, and the tier-2 nuclear reactor safety requirements for the 
PROMETHEUS flight nuclear reactor design, pre-launch operations, launch, ascent to earth 
orbit, operation, and disposal. NR approval is requested to transmit these requirements, 
following incorporation of NR comments, to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to ensure consistency 
between the reactor safety requirements and the spacecraft safety requirements. 
VL CONCURRENCE 
The Managers, Reactor Safety Engineering, KAPL (Dietershagen), MER Reactor Safety, Bettis 
(Lawson), Space Power Program (Wollman), and Space Engineering (Eshelman, for Zika) 
concurred with this recommendation in their respective areas of cognizance. 
Very truly yours 
biwhi~ b h u 4  
Dimitrios Kokkinos, Advisory Engineer 
Space Reactor Safety 
NRPCT 
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Table 1: PROMETHEUS Flight Reactor Safety Issues 
Initiating Event Category 
Pre-Launch Accident 
during Processing, 
Transport, or Handling at 
the Launch Site 
Launch Vehicle Accident 
Reactivity Control Device 
Failure 
Inadvertent Reactor 
Startup 
Propulsion Failure 
Guidance Failure 
Range Safety Destruct 
Orbital Maneuvering 
- 
Failure 
Uncontrolled Reentry lntaci 
~ncon%led ree* and 
breakup during launch and 
ascent 
Uncontrolled reentry and 
breakup from earth orbit 
after reactor startup 
Accidental release of 
fission products during 
reactor operation 
Uncontrolled reentry or 
release of fission products 
and other hazardous 
materials in a region of 
space or on the surface of 
a planet or a moon of 
interest (e.g. Europa) after 
completion of the mission. 
Concern 
Uncontrolled criticality due to core 
distortion, reactivity control devices 
repositioning to critical 
configuration, reactor flooding, or 
other means by which neutron 
leakage or moderation occurs 
Uncontrolled criticality as a result 
of geometric distortion by shock 
wave 
Uncontrolled criticalitv due to 
neutron leakage decrease or 
moderation 
Uncontrolled criticality due to 
reactor impact on earth, core 
distortion, sliders repositioning to 
critical configuration, reactor 
flooding, burial in dry or wet sand 
Heat-up, ablation, and dispersion 
of toxic and radioactive material 
due to friction with atmosphere and 
upon earth impact. 
Heat-up and ablation of toxic and 
radioactive material due to friction 
with atmosphere: widespread 
dispersion. 
Reactor accident damages the 
reactor and releases fission 
products in an important region of 
space (e.g., near earth or near 
another planet of interest), thus 
making that region of space 
unusable for future missions 
Dispersion of radioactive and other 
hazardous materials contaminating 
a region of space or the surface of 
the planethnoon and impacting 
future missions. 
Safety Issue 
Energy or 
radiation 
release 
Energy or 
radiation 
release 
Energy or 
radiation 
release 
Energy 
release, 
radiation 
release, 
fission product 
dispersal 
Dispersion of 
toxic and 
radioactive 
material 
Dispersion of 
toxic and 
radioactive 
material 
Dispersion of 
radioactive 
and other 
hazardous 
material 
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Safety I Initiating Event Category I Concern ( Safety Issue 
lssue 
Soecial I Thewdiversion of S~ecial 1 Deliberate acts desianed to take I Terrorism. , ~ 
Nuclear I Nuclear Material ' I control of Special ~uclear Material I Nuclear 
Material Sabotage 
Protection 
1 proliferation 
Launch Vehicle Accident, Control of Special Nuclear Material 
Fire or Explosion lost due to accident 
Range Safety Destruct 
Propulsion Failure 
Guidance Failure 
( Uncontrolled Reentry Intact ( 
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Table 2: PROMETHEUS Project: Reactor Safety Tier-1 Requirements 
Tier 1 Requirements 
1. Construction. trans~ortation and oneration of a fliaht reactor. fliaht nrototmes and 
~ ~ 
ground based protitype reactors i i l l  not result in> significant i kease  in iisk to the 
health and safetv of the ~ub l i c  and to the environment relative to the risk associated I 
with normal human actiiity. I 
Table 3: PROMETHEUS Flight Reactors: Reactor Safety Tier2 Requirements 
Tier 2 Requirements 
Radioloaical and Criticalitv Safety 
Pre-Launch Phase 
1.1 The risk to the health and safety of the public due to operation or 
inadvertent startup of a PROMETHEUS reactor prior to launch (including 
assembly and pre-launch operations at the launch site) shall be reduced to 
an acceptable level by a combination of design features, detailed 
procedures, and rigorous training and oversight. 
Launch. Ascent, and R e e n t ~  Phase 
1.2 The PROMETHEUS flight reactor design shall include features to reduce to an 
acceptable level the risk to the public due to inadvertent criticality as a result of an 
accident during launch and ascent to earth orbit. 
O~eration Phase 
1.3 Earth re-entry of a reactor after power operation shall be precluded for all 
normal conditions and credible accident conditions by a combination of 
planning, operational controls and design features. 
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Tier 2 Requirements 
Environmental Protection 
2.1. The PROMETHEUS flight nuclear systems shall be designed with positive 
measures or features to reduce to an acceptable level the amount of toxic and 
radioactive materials that could be dispersed during credible launch/ascent or 
reentry accidents. 
2.2. Mission planning for PROMETHEUS flight reactor systems shall include disposal 
in a manner that avoids unacceptable impact on extraterrestrial environments. 
1 Special Nuclear Materials Safeguards I 1 Reuuirements I 
3.1. Positive features shall be provided to aid in the recovery of the special nuclear 
material in the event of an accident during launch, ascent to earth orbit, or 
accidental re-entry. 
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